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BOMBER OFFENSIVE 
An article by 
Air Commodore L. MacLean 
* * * 
Smooth the descent and easy is the way: 
The gates of hell stand open night and day 
But to return, and view the cheerful skies, 
In this the task and mighty labour lies. 
* * * -Dryden
"You can stand in any one of a thousand places in the 
larger cities of Germany and as far as the eye can see there is 
nothing but ruin. Many of · those areas will not be rebuilt for 
generations-if they are rebuilt at all." Those are the opening 
words of an article entitled "Thoughts on the Devastation of the 
German Cities," by Leo A. Codd, Editor of the American maga­
zine Ordnance. H<:\ continues: "Words and photographs are in­
adequate to describe the degree of damage that has been done to 
European culture in all the countries where total war from the air 
was waged." 
From the spiritual he descends to the material and quotes 
statistics: "To appraise the cost to ourselves in material and in ef-
fort ponder these figures: there were more than 1,440,000 bomber 
sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties flown against the enemy. The 
cost in dollars to the United States for its part in the Air War in 
Europe was more than $43,000,000,000." His figures are taken from 
the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and are therefore au­
thoritative. 
This article is reprinted from the British Magazine, "Fighting Forces." 
The opinions expressed are those of the author. Its publication here­
in reflects neither the approval nor disapproval of the U. S. Navy or 
the Naval War College. It is presented merely to acquaint officers with 
one point of view. 
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The cost of the British share, extending as it did over a much 
longer period, cannot have been less. We thus reach a combined 
total, expressed in sterling, for the whole air war in Europe, of the 
order of 21,000,000,000 pounds, a figure at which comprehension 
boggles. It would be well indeed to ponder on the return for this 
prodigious outlay since the success or failure of a war, like any 
other form of the business of life, can only be judged on the basis 
of results accruing in relation to energy· expended. Materially this 
country is now bankrupt. Spiritually-"What shall it profit a man 
if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" 
War is essentially an affair of ethics as well as , economics 
and, though the economical aspect presses heavily on the people of 
the world today, the ethical aspect has continuously occupied the 
thoughts of mankind in an unceasing endeavour to diminish war's 
inevitable horrors, and to limit and localize its effects. The advocates 
of "air power", in urging their claim for precedence, took a firm 
stand, with a foot planted squarely on each of these bases. In 
comparison with war waged by military or sea power, air warfare, 
they maintained, would prove not only more humane but incom­
parably cheaper. Humane, they argued, because aerial bombard­
ment would not be directed towards the wholesale destruction of 
humanity, but focussed on those few centres vital to national life, 
would, through a dislocation of governmental control and the 
routine of living, undermine public morale, destroy the will to 
fight and cause a collapse at the centre regardless of the outcome 
of naval or military action. Cheaper-because cheapness is, of 
course, inherent in a short war waged by a small air force whose 
attacks would be so precisely focussed. 
Such was the Air Staff's gospel of war, propagated as­
siduously throughout some twenty years from 1919 onwards; and 
the people of this country began ·the war deluded into the belief that 
it was well founded · and practicable. About this let there be no 
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mistake or evasive thinking. The simple summary above is the es­
sence and substance of what was'fed to the public and is essentially 
and substantially what the man in the street believes today. The 
protagonists of this gospel were acclaimed, not because of their 
powers of logical deduction from past events but because, pre­
sumably by divine inspiration, they could, despite the lessons from 
-those events, prophesy a new era.
By 1925 the separatist Air Staff doctrine, purely conjec­
tural, had been crystaUized and was officially enunciated by the 
Commandant of the R. A. F. Staff College as follows: 
"If the Government had decided that the main ef­
fort towards winning the war was to be made by its air 
power, the object of the Air Force will be to dislocate 
the national life of the enemy people: and the vital cen­
tres would then be-:-the seat of government, transport 
and communication systems and the water, light and food 
, supply." 
That the Government did decide, at an early date in hos­
tilities, that the main effort towards winning the war was to be 
made by air power, is easily ascertained by reference to the utter­
ances of such public authorities as Mr. Churchill and Sir Arthur 
Harris. Sir Arthur Harris-a Marshall of the Royal Air Force-­
in his book "Bomber Offensive" writes on page 53: 
"It is worth while remarking that no other 
country in the world had at that time* conceived the pos­
sibility of using an air force in this way to fight a war 
by itself and, within certain limits, win a war outright." 
On page 54: 
"Winning a war by bombing as at that time** we 
were proposing to do." 
* 1940
** 1941 
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And, finally on page 76: 
The general idea at this time*** on what civil 
serv�nts always call a high level, was that the main and 
almost the only purpose of bombing was to attack the 
morale of the industrial workers." 
Similarly, Mr. Churchill, in a number of speeches, left little 
doubt on the point, but in particular, in an address to Congress 
in Washington on 19th May, 1943, he said: 
"Opinion, Mr. President, is divided as to whether 
th� use of air power by itself will bring about a collapse 
of Germany or Italy. The experiment is well worth trying." 
It is unnecessary further to labour the point. We have from 
these two supreme authorities that it was the policy of the Govern­
ment, accepted by the Air Staff, that the Air Force should at­
tempt the task of fighting and winning a war by an unprecedented 
process emploring an entirely new technique---the process of strik­
ing direct at the vital centres in the enemy's economy, using a 
technique of selective obliteration by means of bombs from the air, 
to bring about a collapse of public morale and the surrender of the 
enemy government through popular pressure. 
Since the collapse of neither Italy nor Germany did oc­
cur until, in the first case American and British armies had over­
run the country, and in the second American, British and Russian 
armies had, foot by foot, fought their way to a convergence from 
all sides on to Germany's capital with her armies hemmed in and 
immovable, it is unnecessary to labour the failure of this air­
power experiment--the most costly in history . 
••• 1942 
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Despite this failure, the old soothsayers-unabashed, un­
ashamed and active-are still making the same prophecies and the 
bomber doctrine is still booming. It is therefore more than ever 
necessary to extricate from the morass of propaganda the few 
pieces of substance and truth. 
In previous articles I have indicated the oblique conse-
� quences, on naval and military operations, of the separatist doc­
trine. In this article I intend to trace the course of the central 
bomber offensive, not with a view to emphasizing its self-evident 
failure but in order to reach some estimate Qf how much or how 
little it contributed towards, or even retarded, victory. 
The indispensable foundation, to bring the experiment even 
into the realms of feasibility, is the ability on the part of the 
bombing force to hit. a preselected target of known importance in 
the enemy's economic system. The questions demanding an answer 
are: Did the bomber force in fact possess the required skill? If 
not, to what extent was this skill lacking and were the Air Staff 
. aware of its absence before war began? 
The first lesson, learned at a desperate price, was that day­
light bombing was out of the question. Both Lord Tedder and 
Sir Arthur Harris leave little doubt about that. Tedder, in the 
course of a lecture at Cambridge on 18th February, 1947, stated: 
"Our operations against the Germ1;1,n fleet showed up one 
respect in which we had been wrong. It had been thought that, 
though the.bomber could not by its very nature be as fast as the 
fighter, yet it could cope with the fighter provided it had sufficient 
speed and effective defensive armament. The heavy casualties 
suffered by the raids off Kiel and Wilhelmshaven showed that this 
was not the .case and from that time on till late in the war the 
great bulk of our bomber operations over Germany were at night." 
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Harris, less circumlocutory, on page 73 of "Bomber Of­
fensive," states. 
"The German defenses were so strong that it was impossible 
to operate regularly or with any sizeable force by day, so that all 
our main operations were confined to the hours of darkness." 
On page 80: 
"Our attacks on the German naval units during the phoney 
war had shown that we could not operate by day over Germany 
without completely prohibitive casualties for day fighters and we 
at once began to ppepare and train for bo:qibing at night." 
Moreover, on page 39 he demolishes the implication by 
Tedder that reasonable care had been devoted to ensuring that our 
bombers were adequately fast and armed. He states: 
"The Hampden was cold meat for any determined fighter in 
daylight as I knew it would be and we got one or two pretty 
serious knocks. The Hampden was then a most feebly armed 
aircraft with a single gun on top and a single one underneath 
manned by a gunner in a hopelessly cramped position, together 
with a gun firing forward which, as it was fixed, was of no value 
at all." 
Wing Commander Guy Gibson, V. C., describes, in "Enemy 
Coast Ahead," one of the serious knocks which Harris mentions. 
He writes, on page 67 : 
"When, however, these Hampden squadrons ;were given 
their chance and did get to Norway in daylight it was pretty fierce 
slaughter. Their orders were to fly in a very tight box so as to 
bring as much defensive armament as possible to bear on oncoming 
fighters, but the Germans were no fools ; they had found a weak 
spot in the Hampdens, for at that time there was a blind area on 
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either side and the Huns made the best of their knowledge _______ _ 
Their mode of attack was to fly in formation with the Hampdens 
perhaps fifty yards out and slightly to the front, and pick off the 
outside men with their one gun aiming with a no-deflection shot 
at the pilot. The bomber boys could do nothing about it; they 
just had to sit there and wait to be shot down. If they broke away 
they were immediately pounced on by three Messerschmitt 109's 
waiting in the background. If they stayed the pilot received a 
machine-gun serenade in his face. One by one they were hacked 
down from the wing man inwards. Watts said it was a terrible 
sight to see them burst into flames at about twenty feet, then 
cartwheel one wing into the cold sea. First B Beer went; that was 
poor old Peter. Who was next? There was H Harry on the out­
side. The German gunner carefully took aim, then a few minutes 
later H Harry disappeared beneath the flaming waves. That was 
poor old Charles. One pilot made the hopeless gesture of pulling 
back his hood and firing his revolver at the enemy gunner, but it 
) . 
was no good and his brave act was the last thing he did on this 
earth. At last low cloud was reached and four out of the twelve 
managed to scrape home." 
This kind of slaughter was not peculiar to the Hampdens. 
Wing Commander Asher Lee, in his book "The German Air Force," 
describes the fate of theBattle and Blenheim squadrons in 1940. He 
writes on page 55 : 
"The same relative impotence characterized the daylight 
attacks by British Blenheims and Battles on German troops and 
communications in the battle area. Flying mostly without escort 
and in small numbers, they were engaged in operations which 
were at best hazardous and in the main suicidal." 
By the time that it had been decided to resort to night 
bombing as the panacea against slaughter, the bomber force had 
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